were not direct competitors in a product market. 7 If these statements are accurate, the district courts' practice may be in conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's warning about any "categorical denial of injunctive relief" to a broad class of patent holders. Since then, however, there have been concerns regarding the potential patent hold-up caused by patent owners and their ability to derive higher royalties under the threat of an injunction. Indeed, several researchers continued to call for limiting injunctive relief further and, specifically, for entities that are not manufacturers 8 .
In short, almost a decade after the eBay ruling, there is still significant confusion about the implications and impact of this decision. Some of the questions that emerge are: Has the rate of injunctions been impacted by eBay, and if so, by how much? And, which types of parties are impactedpracticing (PEs) or non-practicing entities (NPEs)? There has not been a systematic empirical study that explores whether the eBay ruling impacted practicing and non-practicing patent holders differentially, by examining an exhaustive set of motions and rulings on both preliminary and permanent injunctions and comparing the rates pre-eBay and post-eBay, while also controlling for patent quality, judge and judicial district.
With the help of case studies and smaller sample data sets, some studies assessed how the courts' treatment of injunctions changed since eBay and how the characteristics of patent holders and patents could have been a factor. Some scholars have claimed that post-eBay case law seems to be leaning towards a one-sided approach that favors a manufacturing licensee's point of view with little consideration given to the impact on firms with other kinds of legitimate business models, such as innovators with limited or no presence in downstream markets ("non-manufacturing" or "non-practicing" 7 See, e.g., Denicolò, Vincenzo, et al. "Revisiting injunctive relief: Interpreting eBay in high-tech industries with non-practicing exercise requires the enormous step of hand-coding all the plaintiffs involved in all the patent cases in our study, which we describe in Section IV.
To summarize, the goal of this study is to identify: (1) The difference in the rate at which both preliminary and permanent injunctions were granted for cases where an injunction was requested, based on the rate at which these motions were filed pre-and post-eBay; (2) Whether the rate of injunctions granted was different based on patent ownership (practicing versus non-practicing entities), and whether there was a difference within the different types of non-practicing entities. In addition, any outcome of patent cases must take into account the quality of the patents asserted. Therefore, while studying whether injunctions were granted or not, we control for proxies for patent quality based on the received citations and other metrics.
The eBay ruling was a measure to mitigate the frequent granting of injunctions, arguably ones that specifically target non-practicing entities. The ruling was an exogenous shock to both practicing and non-practicing entities. If it is true that the eBay ruling had an impact on non-practicing entities versus on the practicing entities, the ruling resembles a natural experiment. Consequently, we employ a differencesin-differences strategy to compare the group that was treated (non-practicing entities) versus the group that was not (practicing-entities) in our outcome variable of interest: the change in rate of injunctions granted.
If it is true that, controlling for the quality of patents involved, the courts provide preferential treatment to practicing entities over non-practicing entities, then there are important policy implications.
First, penalizing all "non-manufacturing" patent holders may be not be optimal, as many truly innovative research-oriented (and non-manufacturing) firms, inventors, and university labs operate in high-tech markets today. Recent studies revealed how critical it is to unpack the definition of NPEs, as various diverse types of entities are often collapsed into this definition. 11 Second, this finding will have implications for current patent legislative reform that is trying to curb patent litigation by so-called "patent trolls." If the courts are stacked in favor of practicing entities, in terms of the likelihood of granting an injunction, then non-practicing entities have lower bargaining power in litigation (and therefore in licensing negotiations) than the proposers of the current reform are concerned about. If, however, findings show that there is no differentiation based on who owns the patents at issue and that the rate of injunctions has reduced for everyone, it would imply that the alleged risk of potential "patent holdup" under the threat of an injunction has been mitigated 12 .
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the important and unique role of injunctions as a remedy in patent cases, and why there is no clear economic substitute to such a remedy, therefore highlighting the importance of understanding the impact of eBay on the availability of injunctions as a remedy. Section III explores the impact of eBay on the behavior of firms for seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions, as well as case outcomes in the courts. Section IV discusses the methodology for categorizing plaintiffs as practicing or non-practicing entities, and discusses the impact of eBay on the behavior of different types of plaintiffs with respect to seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions, as well as the differences in the case outcomes in the courts for practicing vs. non-practicing entities. Section V measures how the likelihood of being granted an injunction varies based on whether the plaintiff is a practicing or a non-practicing entity, based on the impact of the eBay decision, and whether the eBay decision had a differential impact on practicing vs. non-practicing entities. We present our conclusions in Section VI.
II. Background: Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases
11 See, Cotropia, Christopher Anthony, Jay P. Kesan, and David L. Schwartz. "Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs 39 This may be particularly true where the infringer assesses the patent to be weak, and thinks it can limit its costs to the price of litigation. See "Patent Trolls", supra note 5, at 2128. 40 Carlton, supra note 7 at 571.
In order to study the impact of the eBay ruling, we analyzed all patent cases 41 filed at in U.S.
District Courts from 2000-2012, for which there was a motion for an injunction, thereby obtaining a symmetric sample of rulings pre-and post-eBay. We aimed to identify the names of the plaintiffs and defendants for these cases, the patents involved in the cases, whether a motion for an injunction was requested, and whether there was a ruling for an injunction, among other relevant fields, in order to study the questions of interest.
We constructed a universe of patent cases in which most likely have a motion for injunction via a query in Lex Machina. The query consisted of terminated patent cases filed between 01/01/2000 and 12/31/2012 which have the words "motion" and "injunction" within three words of each other. 42 The search resulted in a total of 2,639 patent cases for which a motion for preliminary or permanent injunction was likely to be filed. After careful examination, 456 cases were removed from the dataset due to "false positives" and incorrect case type (i.e., cases that were recorded as patent cases but actually were not).
43
Based on a search of the 39,229 44 patent cases that were filed between the years 2000-2012, we identified a total of 2,183 patent cases for which a motion for a preliminary or a permanent injunction was filed, and these cases formed the basis of this study.
We are interested in cases that have a motion filed for an injunction, and dismiss cases that simply mention injunctive relief in the complaint. For every case, we reviewed the docket to search for key pieces of information regarding the motion for injunction. In many instances, the information was not directly available in the docket text, and in those situations, the actual documents were downloaded and reviewed. By manually sorting the docket of each case, we collected and coded the following pieces of information: (i) the type of the motion for injunction (if filed), that is, whether the motion was filed for a 41 We used the Nature of Suit code 830 in PACER. 42 These cases were identified by text search in Lex Machina for the keywords "motion" and "injunction," such that they appear three or less words apart from each other. We purposely designed our keyword search to be overly inclusive, so that we can remove any false positives after manually reviewing the dockets for each of these cases. 43 336 cases were removed since they did not have a motion for injunction, 97 cases were not the correct NOS code of 830 (i.e., patent cases), and 23 cases were removed as having an incorrect type of injunction. 44 367 false marking cases were removed.
preliminary or a permanent injunction, (ii) the date the motion was filed, (iii) the decision of the motion, (iv) the date the decision was made, and (v) damages information, when available.
We also obtained the following pieces of information for these cases directly via PACER: (i)
filing date of the case, (ii) the names of the plaintiffs and defendants, and (iii) the publication numbers of the patents involved in each case. We further obtained information about the entity based on the patents involved in their associated litigation. In order to create a "quality index" for the patents involved in each case, we utilized the Thomson Patent database for obtaining the forward (received) citations, backward citations, claim count, geographical coverage of the patent, and prosecution period.
The summary statistics for the 2,183 U.S. district court cases filed between 2000-2012, for which a motion for a preliminary or a permanent injunction was sought, are listed in Table 1 . Note that each case can have more than one motion for an injunction; therefore, we also list the summary statistics based on counting the number of motions for injunctions (not at the case level) in Table 2 . Based on these summary statistics, we calculate two rates of interest. First, we calculate the rate of injunctions sought, i.e., the number of motions for injunctions filed as a percentage of the total number of patent cases filed. Figure 1 shows that the total number of patent cases filed has been increasing over time, while the number of preliminary and permanent injunctions sought has been decreasing. The vertical dashed line represents the date when the petition for certiorari was granted in the eBay case (Nov. However, since the total number of times an injunction is sought has reduced after the eBay decision, the actual rate of injunctions granted as a percentage of the total number of cases filed has reduced significantly. Essentially, patent owners are not filing for a motion for an injunction nearly as often as they did prior to the eBay decision. Therefore, if one looks only at the rate of injunctions granted based on the times that injunctions were sought, one gets a partial and somewhat misleading picture that the number of times the injunctions were granted did not fall significantly. This is because such a calculation does not take into account the potential self-selection (i.e., patentee restraint in seeking an injunction) by firms that are seeking injunctions. 45 After the eBay decision, firms are likely to seek an injunction only in cases where they may have a strong reason to do so. Figure 4 demonstrates the number of injunctions granted as a percentage of the total number of patent cases filed, and it shows a clear declining trend. 45 In future work, we plan to test this selection bias based on the patent characteristics for which the injunctions were sought pre and post eBay. Thus, we conclude that the overall rate of preliminary and permanent injunctions, measured as a percentage of the total number of cases filed has decreased post-eBay, and that this drop has primarily resulted from fewer plaintiffs seeking an injunction in the first place.
IV. Injunctions Pre-and Post-eBay for Practicing and Non-Practicing Entities
This section moves on to the next question in our study: Did the eBay decision affect the seeking and granting of injunctions for practicing vs. non-practicing entities differentially? And if so, then what type of non-practicing entities were most affected? In other words, were the courts able to differentiate between firms investing in R&D, individual inventors, universities, versus patent aggregators?
A. Defining NPEs
An important part of this study is to code patent plaintiffs in all the patent cases filed between 2000-2012 in the U.S. district courts as a manufacturing or a non-manufacturing entity. This data created for this study has generated a rich data-set in and of itself for any study on practicing and non-practicing For each of these patents, we obtained reassignment information from the USPTO regarding whether the patent was filed by and/or transferred to the focal entity. Information about whether the company was an original inventor or if they received the patent through reassignment was collected. This allows us to distinguish between, for example, patent-holding companies and technology-development companies. The main distinction where we found the need to exercise the most caution is when coding "individual inventors" versus a "patent holding company." In some cases, individuals reassign their patents from themselves to an entity or corporation that they created for liability reasons. Since these companies do not, in fact, manufacture products, it is not always easy to determine if it is solely an individual inventor using an LLC, for example, to protect himself from legal liability or if it is truly a patent-holding company that obtained the patent from the individual inventor. In-depth research of these companies is necessary, and identification of ownership of the focal entity by the individual inventor is important for accurate classification. When the individual inventor created the entity, is the owner of that entity, and is the original inventor of the patents being litigated, we classify the entity as an "individual inventor."
Based on this methodology, we ended up hand-coding 16,387 number of unique plaintiffs 46 that were identified for the 39,229 patent cases that were filed between 2000-2012 in the district courts. Table   3 displays the summary statistics for the categorization of the patent plaintiffs. Out of the 16,387 plaintiffs categorized, we found 75% (12,220) were operating companies and the rest 25% (4,167) were broadly categorized as "non-practicing" entities. Of the NPEs, roughly 70% (2,932) are patent holding companies and the rest of the 30% comprise other types of entities, such as individual inventors, technology development companies, universities, and failed start-ups. 
B. Patent Characteristics for Practicing Entities vs. Non Practicing Entities
As the debate on the role of NPEs and their economic impact rages, one of the seminal questions is whether NPEs or patent holding companies are simply an alternative business model for monetization of patent portfolios, or whether the patent system is abused by asserting lower quality patents. In this paper, we focus on the study of injunctions, and therefore, we compare the patent quality of practicing vs.
non-practicing entities for the patents involved in cases for which a motion for an injunction was filed.
We rely on various indicators of patent quality that have been utilized in the economic and legal literature, namely: number of received (forward) citations, number of claims, and the number of countries a patent has been filed in (geographic coverage). We also calculate predicted forward citations over the entire lifetime of a patent based on the patent's age and to-date received citations, following the methodology in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996), in order to correct for the fact that patents of a higher age would necessarily have more received citations than the younger patents, ceteris paribus. For this analysis, all design patents were removed because they have different patent quality metrics that would then skew the statistics 47 . Figure 6 lists the patent quality comparisons for 2,881 unique utility patents asserted by 1,767
operating companies and the 496 unique utility patents asserted by NPEs for which a motion for an injunction was filed. Since there is a large difference in number of patent for the two groups, a means test was used to determine if there is truly a difference in the means. 47 Design patents only have one claim and are filed in fewer geographic regions compared to utility patents. We do not find a notable or a systematic difference in the patent characteristics as we would have expected, based on the narrative that NPEs assert weaker patents. If anything, the quality of NPEs is slightly higher in the dimension of forward citations and number of claims, however, the geographical coverage of patents asserted by operating companies is higher. We note the important caveat from this comparison -we are only observing patents that were selected by respective plaintiffs for seeking an injunction -it may be the case that NPEs are not seeking an injunction for "weaker" patents asserted by them, and instead hoping to settle quickly.
We also record and compare the age of the patents for which a motion for an injunction was sought, in order to check if there is any difference in the age of such patents for PEs vs NPEs, in order to address the previous literature suggesting that NPEs are far more likely assert older patents closer to their expiration date. At least for the patents for which an injunction was sought, we do not find nearly as large a difference in age of the asserted patents as in previous studies -for operating companies, the mean age of asserted patents was 14.56 years, while for the NPEs, the mean age of the asserted patents was 15.37 years, and the difference was statistically significant.
Finally, we also compare the length of the case for PEs versus NPEs. 48 We find that on-average, the cases involve NPEs take longer to terminate than the cases involving operating companies.
C. Summary Statistics on Injunctive Relief Pre-and Post-eBay for Practicing Entities vs. NonPracticing Entities
In order to understand the differential effect of eBay on practicing vs. non-practicing entities, we first present the summary statistics for the case-level and motion-level statistics for each type of entity. cases from 2006-2012, significantly higher than the 2,907 cases in the pre-eBay period. It is clear that as the total number of cases increased, the total motions for seeking an injunction dropped -that is, the rate of seeking an injunction dropped both for PEs (by 67%) and NPEs (by 93%). 48 Filing date minus termination date. The statistics at the motion level instead of the case level (as multiple motions may be filed in a single case) paint a very similar picture. For the sake of completion, we include them in Table 5 . In order to clearly understand how the rate of filing a motion for an injunction changes for PEs and NPEs before and after eBay, we plot the yearly rate of filing for a motion from 2000-2012 in Figure 7 . From the rates plotted in the figure, we calculate that the proportion of cases for which an injunction is sought have been reducing throughout the period, but an accelerated decrease starts after eBay. For example, from 2000-2006, operating companies experience a 32% reduction in the rate at which injunction is sought, while NPEs experience a 52% reduction. After eBay, operating companies experience a 52% reduction in the rate at which injunction is sought, while NPEs experience an 86% reduction. Therefore, the drop in the rate at which an injunction is sought by NPEs appears to be steeper. Recall that we calculate the rate of injunctions granted as a percentage of the total number of motions for injunctions that were filed, as shown in Figure 3 . Our analysis shows that the rate of injunctions granted calculated in this way does not reduce significantly --this is because the total number of times an injunction is sought -that is, the denominator in this calculation of the rate of granted injunctions --has reduced after the eBay decision. Breaking down this rate across PEs and NPEs, Figure 8 and Figure 9 demonstrate the rate of preliminary and permanent injunctions granted as a percentage of the total number of motions filed. Although there is volatility, we can see that the rate of injunctions granted for NPEs is always lower than PEs. When we calculate the actual rate of injunctions granted as a percentage of the total number of cases filed, we find that this rate has reduced significantly, more so for NPEs than for PEs. Figure 10 and Figure 11 20 demonstrate the rate at which preliminary and permanent injunctions were granted as a percentage of the total number of cases filed, and it shows a clear declining trend for both PEs and NPEs. 
V. Difference-In-Difference Analysis Pre-and Post-eBay
We first conduct a straightforward analysis to measure whether the differences in the rate of injunctions that were granted declined post-eBay and if so, by how much. We start by a simple logistic regression to understand whether or not the likelihood of an injunction being granted is impacted by the type of entity -NPE or PE, after controlling for patent quality, and furthermore, whether or not eBay had an impact on that likelihood.
We run two regressions on a motion level -for preliminary and permanent injunctions --the outcome variable is coded as a "one" if the preliminary [or permanent] injunction was granted. We control for aggregate average quality characteristic of all the patents involved in the case for which the motion is filed, specifically, the number of predicted forward citations, number of backward citations, number of countries in which the patent is filed, total number of claims, and length of the first claim. We also control for the total length of a case, because it may be an indicator of how important the case is for the parties involved. It is often argued that the venue at which a case is filed and heard has some impact on its outcome, in other words, some judicial districts are considered to be relatively "patent friendly" while others are not. We include judicial district dummies in our regressions to control for the variations in the outcome of an injunction being granted or not, related to the choice of venue. We also included the dummies for judges to control for any variations on the outcome of an injunction being granted or not based on random assignment of the judge for that case. 49 Increasing the dummies for the judges and the judicial district increases the explanatory power of our model, and interestingly, we find that the increase in power is more marked for the control of the judicial districts than for specific judges, suggesting "forum shopping" as an important factor in case outcome. For purposes of simplicity, we will be drawing results and conclusions from the most robust model in terms of ! ! , which is the model controlling for judicial district. We note that the patent cases which involve no patents or design patents only have been 49 Note that due to the large number of judges (522) in our data-set, we include dummy variables for judges with five or more cases assigned through the period from 2000-2012. removed from the regressions. There are a few motions for which it cannot be clearly determined whether or not the motion was filed before or after eBay, and those motions have been removed from these regressions (48 motions removed).
In order to estimate whether the eBay ruling had a differential effect on PEs versus NPEs, we utilize the difference-in-differences methodology by setting the group of PEs as the baseline or the control group, and setting the group of NPEs as the treatment group. Therefore, our null hypothesis is that the eBay ruling affected the injunction rates equally for both groups, and we can reject this hypothesis if we find the difference between the treatment and the control group to be statistically significant due to the eBay ruling. To measure the impact of the eBay ruling on the rate of injunctions, we begin with the following equation: 
Thus, ! ! measures the isolated impact of the eBay ruling, if any, on the change in the outcome variable of interest. Alternatively, adding time and group dummies implies that the coefficient on the interaction between the time and group dummy variables identifies the treatment effect, or the impact of the eBay ruling on the change in the rate of injunctions. In order to create the outcome variable, the rate of injunctions in each group, we calculate the rate at which an injunction is granted for all the patent cases that were filed on a monthly basis.
The results from the logistic regression for preliminary injunctions is listed in Table 6 . We find that when controlling for similar characteristics of patent and case level, the eBay decision plays a role in the likelihood of a preliminary injunction being granted 50 . Specifically, post the eBay decision, controlling for patent quality, case length, and the judicial district, preliminary injunctions are 31% less likely to be granted to anyone seeking an injunction -with all else being equal 51 .
The interaction term is not statistically significant, meaning the likelihood of receiving a preliminary injunction reduced for all types of patent plaintiffs post-eBay and it did not differentially reduce for NPEs as compared to PEs 52 . 50 We also ran the same logistic regressions only for motions in cases that were adjudicated by the courts on the merits, i.e., only motions with a decision of granted, granted in part/denied in part, or denied will be included in the model. We find that the results are consistent with the ones for all motions as listed in Table 6 , and those results are listed in the appendix A1. The magnitude of the effect of eBay on the likelihood of being granted an injunction is lower in magnitude is to be expected, as few cases go all the way through trial. The effect of eBay on the likelihood of being granted an injunction is still statistically significant is important for corroborating the claim that eBay had a negative impact on the grant of a preliminary injunction. 51 Interpretation based on the exponential value of the logistic coefficient. 52 Since the interaction was not significant, the regressions were re-run without the interaction term. The diff-in-diff coefficient, seen in Table 7 , reveals that plaintiffs were not treated differently post eBay. Consistent with the results in Table 6 , the interaction term reveals that the NPEs were not less likely to be granted a preliminary injunction compared to PEs due to the eBay decision, although the NPEs preliminary injunction grant rate was always lower throughout the observed time period (2000-2012). The results from the logistic regression for permanent injunctions are listed in Table 8 , and we find a similar result as for preliminary injunctions, with a slightly larger effect 53 . The eBay decision plays a role in the likelihood of a permanent injunction being granted. Based on interpreting the logit coefficients from the regression in Table 8 , post the eBay decision, permanent injunctions are 44.1% less likely to be granted. The diff-in-diff coefficient reveals that plaintiffs were in fact treated differently post eBay for permanent injunctions. The interaction term reflects the differential impact of eBay on NPEs (vs PEs) and shows that eBay reduced the rate at which permanent injunctions were granted for NPEs compared to PEs at a statistically significant level. 
VI. Analyzing the Impact of eBay on NPEs
One of the goals of this study is to understand whether the eBay decision differentially affects the To answer this question, we ran a logistic regression to understand whether or not the likelihood of an injunction being granted is impacted by belonging to different categories of NPEs, as coded in Section IV -failed start-ups, individual inventors, patent holding company, technology development company, or university (with the operating company as the base category). We ran two regressions on a motion level -for preliminary and permanent injunctions --the outcome variable is coded as a "one" if the preliminary [or permanent] injunction was granted. We control for the aggregate average quality characteristic for all the patents involved in the case for which the motion is filed, specifically, the number of predicted forward citations, number of backward citations, number of countries in which the patent is filed, total number of claims, and length of the first claim. We also control for the total length of a case because it may be an indicator of how important the case is for the parties involved. It is often argued that the venue at which a case is filed and heard has some impact on its outcome, in other words, some judicial districts are considered to be relatively "patent friendly" while others are not. We include judicial district dummies in our regressions to control for the variations in the outcome of an injunction being granted or not, related to the choice of venue. We note that the patent cases which involve no patents or design patents only have been removed from the regressions. There are a few motions for which it cannot be clearly determined whether or not the motion was filed before or after eBay, those motions have been removed from these regressions (48 motions removed). The results in Table 10 demonstrate that failed startups were 8.03 times more likely to obtain a preliminary injunction compared to operating companies. In contrast, individual inventors were 60.7% less likely to obtain a preliminary injunction relative to operating companies. The patent holding companies do not show a difference relative to operating companies. Post eBay, the likelihood of obtaining a preliminary injunction reduces by 32% (consistent with our previous results in Table 6 ). that individual inventors lose a majority of the lawsuits as plaintiffs while the failed startups win a majority of their lawsuits 56 .
The results in Table 11 demonstrate that patent holding companies are 82.2% less likely to obtain a permanent injunction. Post eBay, the likelihood of obtaining a preliminary injunction reduces by 41.4%
(consistent with our previous results in Table 8 ). 
VII. Implications and Conclusions
We find that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange has had a significant impact on injunctive relief in patent cases. Contrary to earlier empirical studies involving small sample datasets, our extensive analysis with a significant dataset involving thousands of patent cases both preand post-eBay shows that the eBay decision has reduced, rather dramatically, both the level at which injunctive relief is sought in patent cases and the rate at which they are granted, particularly for preliminary injunctions. We find that all entities -practicing and non-practicing -are less likely to file for a motion of an injunction after eBay, and that this likelihood of filing for an injunction reduces at a higher rate for NPEs compared to PEs. Therefore, the fact that the rate at which injunctions are grantedcalculated as a proportion of the total number of patent cases filed -is decreasing is clearly occurring due to the self-selection by patentees who are moving less often for an injunction.
We also study the impact of the eBay decision on the quality of patents for which injunctive relief is sought and the nature of the patent plaintiff (operating company vs. non-operating company) and their relative success rates with obtaining injunctive relief. We do find a statistically significant difference between some of the observable patent quality characteristics of the patents held by PEs vs. NPEs, for which a motion for an injunction is filed, but we find that NPEs tend to file a motion for an injunction for higher quality patents on average. We do not find that the overall quality characteristics of patents for which a motion for an injunction is filed has increased after eBay, which could have served as one potential mechanism of the self-selection by firms to seek injunctions only for slightly higher quality patents post-eBay.
By controlling for various patent and case level observable characteristics, we estimate whether or not the likelihood of obtaining an injunction varies across PEs and NPEs. We find that both for preliminary and permanent injunctions, NPEs are not less likely to obtain an injunction, after controlling for patent characteristics and the length of the case (from filing to termination) throughout the 2000-2012 time period. We also find that the eBay ruling reduced the likelihood of all firms receiving either preliminary or permanent injunctions.
In order to understand whether or not the eBay ruling had a differential impact on PEs vs. NPEs, we utilize a difference-in-difference model. We find that the eBay ruling did not have a differential impact on the likelihood of NPEs to be granted a preliminary injunction as compared to PEs -in other words -the likelihood of being granted a preliminary injunction reduced equally both for NPEs and PEs post eBay. However, we do find a differential impact of the eBay ruling on PEs vs. NPEs for permanent injunctions. We find that NPEs are less likely to be granted a permanent injunction post-eBay compared to PEs, after eBay.
This study raises important policy questions about the current diminished role for injunctive relief in patent cases. First, not only does the likelihood of receiving an injunction reduce for cases for which a motion for an injunction is filed, firms do not seek an injunction as often in the first place. Second, the eBay ruling impacts NPEs more than PEs, in terms of reducing the likelihood of NPEs receiving a permanent injunction post eBay.
Further study of this topic should analyze why NPEs are receiving differential treatment both before and after eBay. Classic legal and economic theory suggests that patent courts should be agnostic regarding who owns the patents but rather rule upon the quality of the patents at issue and their infringement. Is the differential conduct due to patent quality, difference in litigation conduct by PEs vs.
NPEs, or a bias in the courts? Regardless of the differential impact on PEs vs. NPEs and its reason, we find significantly reduced use of an injunction as a remedy, with systematic declines for both PEs and NPEs after eBay. Given the non-substitutable nature of injunctions as a remedy in patent disputes, this result has important consequences for patent policy. 
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